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MESSAGE (ENGLISH VERSION) | |
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CEZ has today delivered „Information on operating events at Temelin
Nuclear Power Plant in the years 2002-2007“
CEZ Power Company has today presented to the Prime Minister of the Czech
Republic the official „Information on operating events at Temelin
Nuclear Power Plant“. This Information was prepared following the
requirement which resulted from discussion of the Minister of Industry
and Trade Martin Riman, Minister of Environment Martin Bursik,
Chairwoman of the State Office for Nuclear Safety Dana Drabova and
representatives of CEZ taking place on 17 March, 2007.
Since the initiation of trial operation in 2002, there has been no
operating event which might be rated as an incident or accident by the
international INES scale at Temelin. The Information describes 166
operating events classified as 0 – deviation and 1 – anomaly.
The number of events within its five-year operation, that is in the
years 2002-2007, is comparable to the statistics of Dukovany Nuclear
Power Plant in the years 1993-1998, which was a period more than 5
years after the last Dukovany Unit had been put into operation. Temelin
Nuclear Power Plant started its trial operation on June 10, 2002 (Unit
1) and on April 18, 2003 (Unit 2). The last, fourth unit of Dukovany
plant, was put into trial operation in 1987. In 2003-2006, when both
units were under trial operation, Temelin reached from 16 to 22 INES 0
and 1 events per each unit. Dukovany plant recorded roughly 23 to 28
INES 0 and 1 events per each unit in the period from 1993 to 1998.
At present, after 20-year operating experience, Dukovany ranks among the
world´s top nuclear installations regarding operational safety.
”Statistics of operating events at Temelin is comparable to the
starting stage of the operation in Dukovany. Our goal is to get Temelin
to the present level of Dukovany and operate both Czech nuclear power
plants at the same level of operational safety and reliability,“ said
Vice-Chairman of the Board of Directors and Chief Production Officer of
CEZ Jiri Borovec, and he added: „Since 2004, Temelin has managed to
maintain the trend of a decreasing number of events classified by the
INES scale, and that is a sign of gradual stabilization of the units
operation“.
152 out of total 166 events were rated as INES 0, which is a deviation
where operational limits and conditions are not exceeded. Such
deviations include, for example, a planned reactor trip, spurious
initiation of safety systems without significant implications or minor
spreads of contamination within controlled areas without implications
for safety culture. In the stated period, 14 INES 1 events occured,
which was anomaly beyond the authorised regime. Since Temelin was put
into operation, there has been no event which would be classified as
INES 2 or above, i.e. an incident with significant failure in safety
provisions.
The stated INES 0 and 1 events can be divided into 6 groups. Most cases
(69) were related to events which changed the condition of some of
multiple barriers and protection levels in the concept of defence in
depth remaining. The causes included, for example, faulty manipulation
or incorrect assessment of equipment´s condition. Several cases included
malfunction on equipment in the plant technological systems, The second
most frequent case, with 56 events, was the working place contamination
in controlled areas without impact on environment.
The “Information on operating events at Temelin NPP in the years
2002-2007“ contains a part dedicated to comparison of Temelin plant to
power plants in France in this area. The evaluation covered results of
58 French nuclear units in the period from 2000 until 2006. France
recorded roughly 1.1 events per each unit and year at INES 1level.
Temelin´s value in the period under consideration was 1.4 events.
Regarding the INES 0 level, French power plants had 7 events per each
unit and year, while Temelin reached 15 events in this category.
“When comparing operation of Temelin with French units, it is necessary
to take into account the fact that most French nuclear power plants had
already been operating for long time in the period between 2000 and 2006
having over two to three decades of operational experience as they had
started their operation in the 80´s of last century. If compared to
Dukovany, which has the same length of operation, the Czech power
company achieved even better results than the French, when it had no
INES 1 event between 2004 and 2006, and last year its four units reached
only 14 INES 0 events. The goal of Temelin is to reach similar results
as Dukovany, which can be achieved only through patient work and other
years of operational experience,“ says Vladimir Hlavinka, Director of
Temelin NPP.
In order to stabilize its operation, Temelin has started the programme
„SAFELY 15 TERA“, whose goal is to reach expected safe and reliable
yearly electricity production at the level of 15 TWh in medium term. The
programme is based on three basic areas. The first one is technical
stabilization. “It includes, for example, solution of fuel cycle, but
also change of high-pressure turbine rotors, which is under realization
this year. Further, we will focus on enhancing outage effectivity and
programme of equipment renewal,“ adds Vladimir Hlavinka. The second area
to be improved is the plant′s organizational and personnel
stabilization. The third part of the programme „Safely 15 TERA“ refers
to the improvement of safety culture. “Step by step we must put in
practice the experience from Dukovany′s 20-year´s operation and promote
approved methods of the world nuclear community. Our goals are clear, we
know how to reach them in order to enable Temelin to move from the
average among the nuclear top,“ wishes Vladimir Hlavinka.
Definition of INES 0 and 1 events significance according to the User´s
Manual of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna:
INES 0 – deviations where operational limits and conditions are not
exceeded and which are properly managed in accordance with adequate
procedures. Examples include: a single random failure in a redundant
system discovered during periodic inspections or tests, a planned
reactor trip proceeding normally, spurious initiation of protection
systems without significant consequences, leakages within the
operational limits, minor spreads of contamination within controlled
areas without wider implications for safety culture.
INES 1 - anomaly beyond the authorized regime but with significant
defence in depth remaining. This may be due to equipment failure, human
error or procedural inadequacies and may occur in any area of nuclear
power plant's operation. Examples include: breaches of technical
specifications or transport regulations, incidents without direct safety
consequences that reveal inadequacies in the organisational system or
safety culture, minor defects in pipework beyond the expectations of the
surveillance programme.
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